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MASSACHUSETTS LAW-RELAXING THE ORGANIZED CRIME 
REQUIREMENT FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: A CARTE 
BLANCHE FOR THE "UNIN,'ITED EAR"?-Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 
1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1827, 424 N.E.2d 250; Commonwealth v. 
Jarabek, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1849,424 N.E.2d 49l. 
It is very certain that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself; 
because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation falling 
upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and 
unjust: and it should seem, that search for evidence is disallowed 
upon the same principle. 
Lord Camden, in Enlick v. Carrington, 1765. I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The controversy surrounding the legality of warrants for the 
search of persons or places and the seizure of property has continued 
from the eighteenth century until today.2 One current focus of the 
controversy has shifted from the old grievances of the ransacking of 
persons' houses and seizure of papers by government agents3 to the 
problems of electronic surveillance brought about by an advancing 
I. Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. SI. Tri. 1030, 1073 (K.B. 1765) (Lord Camden 
delivering the opinion of the court). 
2. In fact the court's language in Entick indicates that the problem of search and 
seizure was not unknown in the eighteenth century, and was controversial even then: 
These warrants are not by custom; they go no farther back than 80 years; and 
most amazing it is they have never before this time been opposed or contro­
verted, considering the great men that have presided in the King's-Bench since 
that time. But it was reserved for the honour of this Court, which has ever been 
the protector of the liberty and the property of the subject, to demolish this 
monster of oppression, and to tear to rags this remnant of Star-chamber 
tyranny. 
Id. at 1039. 
3. Entick involved a general warrant issued for the seizure of all the plaintiffs 
personal papers and delivery of the papers with the plaintiff to the Secretary of State, 
Lord Halifax. The warrant was issued on information that the plaintiff was publishing a 
seditious newspaper called the "monitor." Id. at 1034. 
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technology. By the use of modem electronic devices placed within 
buildings or on persons, government officials may "search" the mind 
of an unsuspecting person, and "seize" his thoughts and words on a 
tape for use at tria1.4 The search and seizure controversy over elec­
tronic surveillance first centered on the basic legality of the practice, 5 
and more recently on the delicate problem of prescribing those situa­
tions in which a warrant must precede any such surveillance.6 Two 
recent decisions from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 
Commonwealth v. Thorpe 7 and Commonwealth v. Jarabek,8 illustrate 
the problem of prescribing situations requiring a warrant and high­
light the inability of courts to adequately define the boundaries of 
warrant requirements. Although both decisions involved similar 
factual situations, and were handed down on the same day, the hold­
ings were opposite. 
II. FACTS 
In Thorpe, the defendant, a retired policeman, offered to sell an 
active duty officer a copy of an upcoming promotional exam. He 
stated that the exam was available through an organization headed 
by a woman.9 The active duty officer advised his superiors, and, 
with the cooperation of the State Police and the Attorney General's 
office, plans were made to record subsequent conversations concern­
ing the proposed sale.1O No attempt was made to obtain a warrant 
under the applicable provisions of the commonwealth's electronic 
4. Electronic surveillance was analogized to search and seizure in Berger v. New 
York, 388 U.S. 41, 51, 59 (1967). 
5. The first judicial statement on the legality of electronic surveillance was in Olm­
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). There, the Supreme Court upheld the testi­
mony of a government official who secretly had overheard an incriminating conversation 
from a tapped telephone wire. The court ruled that "search and seizure" in connection 
with wiretapping was beyond the practical meaning of the fourth amendment and sug­
gested that, if Congress wanted construction of the amendment to be so enlarged. it 
should pass legislation to that effect. Id. at 465-66. Justice Brandeis dissented, maintain­
ing that the act of wiretapping by the government official violated both the fourth and 
fifth amendments. Id. at 479. In reviewing this controversy, a later court observed that 
Olmstead caused such widespread dissatisfaction in Congress that the legislature eventu­
ally effectively overruled it by enacting § 605 of the Federal Communications Act, of 
June 19, 1934 (codified at 47 U.S.c. § 605 (1976), which made wiretapping a federal 
crime. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 462 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
6. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
7. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1827,424 N.E.2d 250. 
8. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1849,424 N.E.2d 491. 
9. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1828-29,424 N.E.2d at 251. 
10. Id. at 1829, 424 N.E.2d at 252. 
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surveillance statute. I I 
The active duty officer, using a portable radio transmitter, re­
corded eight subsequent telephone conversations and two face to 
face meetings with the defendant. 12 The superior court used the 
tapes as evidence to indict Thorpe. After denying the defendant's 
motion to suppress the tapes as evidence, the court granted an appli­
cation for interlocutory appeaL 13 The appeal was based on two con­
tentions: The state's use of warrantless recordings violated the state's 
surveillance statute because.the requisite organized crime connection 
was not shown; 14 and the use of warrantless recordings violated the 
defendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches guaranteed 
by the commonwealth's Declaration of Rights. 15 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the supe­
rior court's denial of the motion to suppress the evidence and re­
manded the case for further proceedings. 16 The court concluded 
that, with respect to the organized crime issue, the defendant's refer­
ence to "an organization headed by a woman" was sufficient to fall 
under the warrant exceptions of the statute since it created a reason­
able suspicion that organized crime was involved. 17 As to the unrea­
sonable search issue, the court asserted the "assumption of risk" 
argument, which contends that one who speaks voluntarily assumes 
the risk that the listener may repeat, monitor, or broadcast the con­
versation to others. 18 The consequence of this argument is that there 
II. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 1970). 
12. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1829,424 N.E.2d at 252. 
13. Id at 1828, 1831,424 N.E.2d at 250, 253. 
14. Warrantless electronic recordings are permitted in Massachusetts when con­
ducted by law enforcement officials, in connection with a designated offense involving 
organized crime and when recorded either (a) by a consenting participant to the conver­
sations or (b) by the law enforcement official who is a party to the conversation himself. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99B4 (West 1970). 
15. The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provides: 
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and 
seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All war­
rants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or function of them be 
not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant 
to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more 
suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special 
designation of the persons or objects of the search, arrest, or seizure: and no 
warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities prescribed by 
the laws. 
MASS. CONST. art. XIV. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV, infra note 109. 
16. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1828, 1842,424 N.E.2d at 250, 259. 
17. Id at 1835-37, 424 N.E.2d at 255-56. By state statute, an organized crime 
nexus is required in addition to one party consent. See supra note 14. 
18. The "assumption of risk" doctrine in connection with surveillance by compan­
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was no unreasonable search, no need for a warrant, and thus no con­
stitutional privacy violation under the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights. 19 
Jarabek, also dealt with warrantless surveillance. A local con­
tractor, unable to complete work for the school board, was told that 
his difficulties could be resolved if he made a contribution to defend­
ant larabek's re-election committee.20 The contractor, in coopera­
tion with law enforcement authorities, recorded five subsequent face 
to face interviews and several telephone conversations with the de­
fendant and with his agent. As in Thorpe, the recordings were made 
without obtaining a warrant.21 
The failure to comply with the statutory warrant requirements 
led the superior court judge to suppress as evidence the tapes and the 
testimony incident to the conversations.22 As in Thorpe, the war­
rantless surveillance issue reached the supreme judicial court by in­
terlocutory appeal.23 The supreme judicial court upheld the lower 
court's finding that there was no evidence of a "continuing conspir­
acy", and thus a scheme by two municipal officials to extort a kick­
back from a single contractor did not fall under the commonwealth's 
statutory definition of organized crime.24 
In handing down these two simultaneous but opposite rulings, 
the supreme judicial court attempted to draw the line for permissible 
warrantless surveillance based on the notion of a continuing conspir­
acy: Where a continuing conspiracy can be found, warrantless sur­
veillance will be permitted. This note will focus on two issues that 
have emerged as a consequence of Thorpe and Jarabek. 
ions was first articulated in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966), and later 
was reiterated in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971). 
19. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1839,424 N.E.2d at 257. 
20. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1850,424 N.E.2d at 492. 
21. Id at 1852,424 N.E.2d at 492. 
22. Id at 1850,424 N.E.2d at 491. 
23. Id 
24. The Massachusetts statute requires that any warrantless surveillance must, 
among other things, be an "investigation of a designated offense as defined herein." 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 9984 (West 1970). The statute further states that 
"[ t)he term 'designated offense' shall include the following offenses in connection with 
organized crime as defined in the preamble ...." Id at § 99B7. The preamble defines 
organized crime in the following terms: "[o)rganized crime, as it exists in the common­
wealth today, consists of a continuing conspiracy among highly organized and disci­
plined groups to engage in supplying illegal goods and services. In supplying these goods 
and services organized crime commits unlawful acts and employs brutal and violent tac­
tics." Id at § 99A. 
The court, however, did admit into evidence live testimony, finding no constitutional 
bar to its admissibility. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1854,424 N.E.2d at 493-94. 
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First, the continuing conspiracy, or the "Thorpe-Jarabek," stan­
dard for warrantless surveillance as a judicially constructed replace­
ment for the statutory requirement of the existence of organized 
crime will be examined. The second part of the note will focus upon 
the privacy issue raised in Thorpe. 
III. 	 THE THORPE-JARABEK CONTINUING CONSPIRACY STANDARD 
As A LIMITATION ON SURVEILLANCE 
There is a direct relationship between the Thorpe-Jarabek stan­
dard of organized crime and the limitations on electronic surveil­
lance in Massachusetts. By examining Thorpe and Jarabek, and the 
state and federal surveillance statutes, this section will argue that the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has permitted the common­
wealth to exercise surveillance powers broader than those intended 
by the legislature. 
A. Statutory Background 
Electronic surveillance statutes exist at both the federal25 and 
state levels.26 While Congress intended its legislation to occupy the 
field,27 it specifically provided an enabling provision for state legisla­
tion conceived within the federal boundary.28 This enabling provi­
sion has been interpreted to mean that the federal statute should 
serve as a minimum standard and that state surveillance statutes will 
not be preempted if they are stricter than the federal standard.29 
l. The Federal Statute 
The nation's first federal wiretap statute was section 605 of the 
Communications Act of 1934,30 enacted largely in response to con­
25. The current federal surveillance statute is the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 213·18, 222-23 (1970) (codified at 18 
U.S.c. §§ 2511-2520 (1976 & Supp. V 1981». 
26. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 1970). 
27. United States v. Curreri, 388 F. Supp. 607, 615 (D. Md. 1974); Commonwealth 
v. Look, 379 Mass. 893, 907 n.9, 402 N.E.2d 470, 481 n.9, cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 827 
(1980); Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass. 224, 245, 327 N.E.2d 819, 833 (1975). 
Where Congress has occupied the field, state legislation is preempted. For a general 
discussion of the Preemption Doctrine, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CON­
STITUTIONAL LAW 267 (1978). 
28. 18 U.S.c. § 2516(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
29. Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass. 224, 247, 327 N.E.2d 819, 833 (1975). 
30. 47 U.S.c. § 605 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 
Title VI, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103). 
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gressional dissatisfaction with existing case law.31 That statute pro­
vided generally that persons transmitting or receiving wire or radio 
communications were not to divulge the contents to anyone other 
than the addressee, and that such communications were not to be 
intercepted or published by anyone not authorized by the sender. 32 
By the 1960's, it was becoming clear that the 1934 statute was inade­
quate to deal with the increased threat to privacy that resulted from 
the use of sophisticated electronic devices.33 Congress responded by 
amending section 605 with broad new provisions in Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.34 
This statute is the currently effective federal statute governing 
electronic surveillance. It prohibits the unauthorized interception, 
use, or disclosure of wire or oral communications.35 Authorized in­
terceptions are permitted when used in connection with serious 
offenses.36 
31. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 462 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
Case law at that time stemmed from the first electronic surveillance case to reach the 
Supreme Court, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). In Olmstead, the Court 
allowed evidence from a warrantless telephone tap to stand because the tapping connec­
tions were made in public places, and had resulted from no acts of trespass against plain­
tiff's home, person, papers or effects. Id at 464-65. . 
32. 47 U.S.c. § 605 (1976). 
33. For cases which mention or discuss this threat, see, e.g., United States v. White, 
401 U.S. 745, 761-65 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 
46-49 (1967); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 508-09 (1961); On Lee v. United 
States, 343 U.S. 747, 759 (1952) (Frankfurther, J., dissenting); United States v. Carroll, 
332 F. Supp. 1299, 1300 (D.D.C. 1971); United States v. Jones, 292 F. Supp. 1001, 1008­
09 (D.D.C. 1968), rev'd, 433 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950 (1971). 
For an example of the extremes to which agents will go to obtain surveillance, see 
White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975) (police officers 
posing as students in classrooms). 
The growing threat of increased surveillance aided by escalating technology has 
been much discussed by commentators. See, e.g., M. BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS 
151 (1964) (threat of new technology); G. McLELLAND, ed., THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 85­
89 (1976) (spread of "wildcat surveillances," unrestricted computer surveillance, statu­
tory loopholes); A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 24-53 (2d ed. 1971) (rise of com­
puters and data processing techniques in surveillance); W. PETROCELLI, Low PROFILE 
173-79 (1981) (new devices such as the "bionic briefcase," shotgun microphones, the "in­
finity transmitter," plus the growing threat of legal wiretapping by the telephone com­
pany); J. RAINES, ATTACK ON PRIVACY 31-33,87 (1974) (political uses of surveillance); 
R. SMITH, PRIVACY 229-79 (1979) (new devices such as "laser-beam bugs," "bumper­
beepers" and the use of ultra-miniaturization technology); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND 
FREEDOM 73-78 (1967) (various technological advances). 
34. 18 U.S.c. §§ 2511-2520 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
35. Id at § 2511(1)(a)-(c). 
36. Serious offenses include espionage, sabotage or treason, 18 U.S.c. § 2516(1)(a) 
(1976); illegal payments or loans to labor organizations, murder, kidnapping, robbery or 
extortion, id at § 2516(l)(b); counterfeiting, id at § 2516(1)(d); bankruptcy fraud, id at 
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Apart from the warrant provisions, the federal statute37 spells 
out two permissible circumstances for warrantless surveillance. A 
person acting under color of law may make a warrantless intercep­
tion either when such a person is party to the communication,38 or 
when one of the parties to the communication has given prior con­
sent to such interception. 39 
Congress' intent in enacting this statute is well documented. Ti­
tle III was drafted specifically to conform to the new constitutional 
standards established by recent Supreme Court decisions.40 The 
overall and pervading purpose was to combat organized crime.41 
The statute has two additional purposes: first, to protect the privacy 
of wire and oral communications; and second, to make the condi­
tions, under which interception is permitted, uniform.42 In connec­
tion with this latter purpose, courts have found that Congress 
intended Title III to serve as a minimum national standard for elec­
tronic surveillance.43 Therefore state surveillance statutes are valid 
only to the extent that they are stricter than the federal standard.44 
2. Massachusetts Statute 
The Massachusetts electronic surveillance statute, like its fed­
eral counterpart, contains a general prohibition against interception 
of communications, with limited exceptions.45 One such exception is 
an interception made under authorization of a warrant.46 Further, 
the statute specifies that the recording or transmitting of communica­
§ 2516( 1)( e); and offenses under the general category of "racketeering", id at 
§ 2516(1)(c). 
37. 18 U.S.c. § 25 1\ (2)(c) (1976). 
38. Id See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Lopez v. United 
States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). There is also a provision for such persons not acting under 
color of law, "unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing 
any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States 
or of any State or for the purpose of committing any other injurious act." 18 U.S.c. 
§ 251 I (2)(d) (1976). 
39. Id See, e.g., On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
40. The cases codified by the statute were Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). See S. REP. No. \097, 90th Cong., 
2d Sess. 66 reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2112, 2153. 
41. Id at 70, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 2157. 
42. Id at 66, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 2153. 
43. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Look, 379 Mass. 893, 907 n.9, 402 N.E.2d 470, 481 
n.9 (1980). 
44. See supra note 29. 
45. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99CI (West 1970). 
46. Id at § 99Dld. 
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tions by law enforcement officials will not constitute an interception 
if the official either is a party to such communication, or has prior 
authorization to record or transmit by such a party, and, in both 
cases, provided that the recording or transmission is made in the 
course of an investigation of a designated otfense.47 Designated of­
fenses include a specified list of crimes in connection with organized 
crime as defined in the statute's preamble.48 By making such record­
ings or transmissions exceptions to the interception definition, the 
state statute permits warrantless surveillances if the recorder or 
transmitter either is a party to the communication itself or has per­
mission from one of the parties. 
The Massachusetts electronic surveillance statute is stricter than 
the federal one. The federal statute permits warrantless surveillance 
in situations in which one party has consented or a law enforcement 
officer is a party, while the state statute requires, in addition, that the 
investigation concern organized crime. 
B. The Thorpe-Jarabek Anarysis 
In Commonwealth v. Thorpe,49 the warrantless recordings made 
by the active duty officer were permissible under the federal statute 
because the recording officer was a party to the conversation. 50 
Under Massachusetts law, the recording officer would have to have 
been a party to the conversation, and, in addition, the recording 
would have to have been made in connection with an investigation 
of organized crime.51 Defendant Thorpe argued that his act of sell­
ing the exams was solitary and isolated and not indicative of organ­
ized crime activity.52 Therefore, to hold the warrantless surveillance 
legal, the commonwealth had to classify Thorpe's activity as "organ­
ized crime." 
In its attempt to classify Thorpe's activity, the court turned first 
47. Id. at § 9984. 
48. Id. at § 9987. The following are "designated offenses" in connection with or­
ganized crime: arson; assault and battery with a dangerous weapon; extortion; bribery; 
burglary; embezzlement; forgery; gaming, intimidation of a witness or juror; kidnapping; 
larceny; lending violations; mayhem; murder; possession or sale of narcotics or harmful 
drugs; perjury; prostitution; robbery; subornation of perjury; violations of the electronic 
surveillance statute; and accessory to or conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the fore­
going. Id. 
49. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1827, 424 N.E.2d 250. 
50. See 18 U.S.c. § 2511(2)(c) (1976). 
51. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 9984 (West 1970). 
52. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1832,424 N.E.2d at 253. 
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to the full definition of organized crime found in the preamble of the 
surveillance statute: 
The general court finds that organized crime exists within the 
commonwealth and that the increasing activities of organized 
crime constitute a grave danger to the public welfare and safety. 
Organized crime, as it exists in the commonwealth today, consists 
of a continuing conspiracy among highly organized and disci­
plined groups to engage in supplying illegal goods and services. 
In supplying these goods and services, organized crime commits 
unlawful acts and employs brutal and violent tactics. Organized 
crime is infiltrating legitimate business activities and depriving 
honest businessmen of the right to make a living. 53 
The court decided that only a portion of the preamble should consti­
tute a definition of organized crime. It agreed with the lower court 
that although the legislature declared that organized crime was de­
fined in the preamble, the entire description of organized crime as 
written therein could not have been intended to be incorporated into 
the definition of designated offenses. 54 The court supported this in­
terpretation by reasoning that "the statute would be unworkable if 
the Commonwealth were required to prove, in every case, that the 
activities [under investigation] constituted 'a grave danger to the 
public welfare and safety,' that 'brutal and violent tactics' were em­
ployed, and that 'legitimate business activities' were being infil­
trated."55 The court concluded that of all the language used in the 
preamble, it appeared that the legislature intended to define organ­
ized crime as a " 'continuing conspiracy among highly organized and 
disciplined groups to engage in supplying illegal goods and 
services.' "56 
In support of this statement, the court offered a footnote citation 
to statutes in New Hampshire, New Mexico and Tennessee that fo­
cus on the elements of discipline, organization, and the provision of 
illegal goods and services. 57 Beyond that, the court offered no evi­
53. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99A (West 1970). 
54. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1833,424 N.E.2d at 254. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 1833-34 n.6, 424 N.E.2d at 254 n.6. The New Hampshire statute defines 
organized crime as "the unlawful activities of the members of a highly organized, disci­
plined association engaged in supplying illegal goods and services, including but not lim­
ited to homicide, gambling, prostitution, narcotics, marijuana or other dangerous drugs, 
bribery, extortion, blackmail and other unlawful activities of members of such organiza­
tions." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:IXI (1974). 
The New Mexico Organized Crime Act states: "'organized crime' means the sup­
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dence to support its contention that the legislature intended only part 
of the preamble definition to apply. 
Next, the court inquired whether an organized crime connection 
existed prior to the Thorpe surveillance. Without such a prior con­
nection, the surveillance would fail to meet the statutory warrantless 
surveillance exception and therefore would be inadmissible.58 The 
only pre-surveillance evidence of organized crime presented to the 
court was defendant Thorpe's initial statement that the examination 
was available through an "organization headed by a woman."59 
The court's inquiry additionally focused on the standard to 
which the decision to intercept should be held. The court rejected 
Thorpe's contention that a probable cause showing of the existence 
of organized crime was necessary; it observed that probable cause is 
the applicable standard when a warrant is sought and that it did not 
believe that the legislature intended to require as stringent a showing 
in situations in which warrantless surveillance is authorized.60 The 
court also rejected the commonwealth's position, which had been ac­
cepted by the court below, that warrantless surveillance may be au­
thorized on a good faith belief by officials. Instead, the court 
prescribed an intermediate standard of reasonable suspicion.61 The 
court then proceeded to negate the effect of its rejection by stating 
that even if a higher standard were necessary, this higher standard 
would be met. The warrantless recording was permissible as evi­
dence because Thorpe's "organization headed by a woman" state­
ment was sufficient to indicate a reasonable suspicion of the presence 
of organized crime.62 
plying for profit of illegal goods and services, including, but not limited to, gambling, 
loan sharking, narcotics and other forms of vice and corruption, by members of a struc­
tured and disciplined organization." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-9-2-A (1978). 
The Tennessee statute states: "organized crime shall be defined as the unlawful ac­
tivities of the members of an organized, disciplined association engaged in supplying 
illegal goods and services, including, but not limited to, gambling, prostitution, loan 
sharking, narcotics, labor racketeering, and other unlawful activities of members of such 
organizations. TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-6-102 (1982 Supp.). 
Compare the definition in the federal statute: "'Organized crime' means the unlaw­
ful activities of the members of a highly organized disciplined association engaged in 
supplying illegal goods and services, including but not limited to gambling, prostitution, 
loan sharking, narcotics, labor racketeering, and other unlawful activities of members of 
such organizations." 42 U.S.c. § 3781(b) (1976). 
58. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 9984 (West 1970). 
59. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1835,424 N.E.2d at 255. See supra note 9 and accom­
panying text. 
60. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1835,424 N.E.2d at 255. 
61. id. at 1836-37,424 N.E.2d at 255-56. 
62. id. at 1837-38, 424 N.E.2d at 256. 
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Thorpe has served to broaden the definition of organized crime 
to encompass any "continuing conspiracy," which may be satisfied 
by as small a showing as the statement "an organization headed by a 
woman." The setting of a lenient standard for the showing of the 
presence of organized crime means that increased levels of warrant­
less surveillance will now be permissible in Massachusetts. 
Jarabek, rendered the same day as Thorpe, turned on the new 
judicial definition of organized crime. The court asserted that the 
organized crime requirement in the Massachusetts surveillance stat­
ute applied whether or not a warrant is obtained prior to the inter­
ception.63 The court upheld the decision below because the lower 
court agreed with the Thorpe definition of organized crime.64 Ob­
serving that the Jarabek facts provided no evidence of a continuing 
conspiracy, the court concluded that the commonwealth's statutory 
definition did not include a scheme to extort kickbacks from a single 
contractor.65 
The combined effect of these two cases is that the judicial defini­
tion of organized crime in Massachusetts now has become a "contin­
uing conspiracy among highly organized and disciplined groups to 
engage in supplying illegal goods and services."66 The supreme judi­
cial court's application of its new standard so far has shown only that 
an organization selling exams fits the description, whereas a scheme 
by municipal officials to extort a kickback does not. 
C. Definitional Problems with the Thorpe-Jarabek Standard 
Taken together, Thorpe and Jarabek have the potential of be­
coming a weak, confusing and inconsistent precedent for use by fu­
ture courts or law enforcement officials in two critical areas: the 
definition of organized crime as found within § 99 of the Massachu­
setts General Laws; a,nd the definition's application to warrantless 
surveillance situations. The definition of organized crime is critical 
63. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1852, 424 N.E.2d at 493. The court relied upon the 
Massachusetts statute which states: 
Upon a showing by the applicant that there is probable cause to believe that a 
designated offense has been, or is about to be committed and that evidence of 
the commission of such an offense may thus be obtained, or that information 
which will aid in the apprehension of a person who the applicant has probable 
cause to believe has committed, is committing or is about to commit a desig­
nated offense may thus be obtained. . . . 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99E2 (West 1970). 
64. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1852,424 N.E.2d at 493. 
65. Id at 1852-53,424 N.E.2d at 493. 
66. Id at 1833, 1852,424 N.E.2d at 254, 493. 
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to law enforcement in Massachusetts because it delineates the point 
where warrantless searches may begin and end. If the definition is 
vague or blurred, the domain of warrantless surveillances may be 
greatly widened, threatening the collective body of two hundred 
years of fourth amendment protections.67 
The definition of organized crime which both Thorpe and 
Jarabek developed is a "continuing conspiracy among highly disci­
plined groups to engage in supplying illegal goods and services."68 
The court, in composing this definition, abridged the legislature's 
statutory definition by dropping three specific elements of organized 
crime: that it must constitute a grave danger to public safety; that it 
must employ brutal and violent tactics; and that it must infiltrate 
legitimate business activities.69 The court reasoned that the addi­
tional elements made the definition unworkable.70 This exercise in 
judicial construction served only to shift the thrust of the definition, 
not to clarify it. 
1. Legislative Intent 
The supreme judicial court premised the adoption of its 
abridged "workable" definition of organized crime on the idea that it 
reflected the intent of the legislature.71 This view, however, was not 
unanimously accepted by the justices. Justice Liacos, dissenting in 
Thorpe, stated that the conclusion of the majority was without sup­
port in the record and contrary to the clear legislative history of the 
statute.72 
An examination of the statute's legislative history supports the 
dissent's interpretation of the intent of the legislature. Until 1968, 
the Massachusetts surveillance statute was similar to that of New 
York.73 In 1968, the Massachusetts legislature revised the surveil­
lance statute to its present form.74 This revision followed a United 
67. See infra text accompanying notes 108-37. 
68. See supra note 66. 
69. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99A(West 1970). 
70. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1833,424 N.E.2d at 254. See also supra text accompa­
nying note 55. 
71. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
72. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1843,424 N.E.2d at 259 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
73. REP. OF THE SPECIAL COMM'N ON ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING, S. Doc. No. 
1132, 165th Gen. Ct., 2d Sess. 5 (1968). 
74. The original changes proposed to the general court by the Senate would have 
required a warrant for any interception not having the consent of an parties involved. 
Id at II. The House version provided for only one party consent, and contained no 
organized crime provision. H.R. Doc. No. 4875, 165th Gen. Ct. 2d Sess. 3 (1968). The 
resulting statute was a compromise between the Senate version, Senate Bill 1218, and the 
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States Supreme Court decision which invalidated the New York stat­
ute and mandated that all aspects of electronic surveillance be 
closely supervised.75 
Several significant points may be noted from the statute's his­
tory. First, the purpose of the state surveillance statute, as with its 
federal counterpart,16 was to fight organized crime, and to supervise 
strictly all electronic surveillance.77 A strict supervision of electronic 
surveillance is not consistent with the Thorpe court's broadening of 
the boundaries of judicially permissible surveillance by expanding 
the definition of organized crime. 
Second, legislative history shows that the Massachusetts statute, 
as originally proposed by the Special Commission on Eavesdrop­
ping, was stricter than the final product in that it required two party 
consent as a safeguard against the abuse of electronic surveillance.78 
The proposal of the House Judiciary Committee included one party 
consent for law enforcement officers, but no organized crime limita­
tion.79 The final product was a compromise: It permitted one party 
House version, re-written as House Bill number 4875, which was passed and enacted on 
July 18, 1968. I JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REP. 2316, 2442 (1968). 
75. In Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), the Supreme Court found that a 
state statute, § 813 of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, exceeded fourth 
amendment warrant standards in the following areas: It authorized eavesdropping with­
out requiring a probable cause showing; it gave authorization to "seize" conversations 
without requiring a description in the warrant of what specific conversations or discus­
sions were being sought; it placed no termination date on the eavesdrop after the conver­
sation sought was "seized"; and it did not provide for the return of the warrant, leaving 
too much discretion to law enforcement officials as to the use of the "seized" conversa­
tions of innocent as well as guilty parties. Id at 59-60. Compare infra note 109. 
76. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
77. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. The importance of permitting 
some surveillance for fighting organized crime is re-emphasized in the letter from Gover­
nor John Volpe to the House and Senate which accompanied House Bill 3797, and which 
stated: "[I]aw enforcement officials elsewhere have found this technique to be a major 
aid in tracking down and convicting members of the underworld." H.R. Doc. No. 3797, 
165th Gen. Ct., 2d Sess. 2 (1968). 
Moreover, in its report to the Massachusetts Senate, the Special Commission on 
Eavesdropping stated: 
The Commission feels that eavesdropping and wiretapping by law enforcement 
officials should be permitted in order to effectively combat the menace of organ­
ized crime, but only if such wiretapping and eavesdropping is limited by the 
standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court. This means that law 
enforcement eavesdropping and wiretapping should be strictly supervised by the 
judicial branch of the government. ... 
REP. OF THE SPECIAL COMM'N ON ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING, S. Doc. No. 1132, 
165th Gen. Ct., 2d Sess. at 7-8 (1968) (emphasis added). 
78. Id. at II. (The statutory standard in Massachusetts at that time was one party 
consent.) 
79. 1968 H.R. Doc. No. 4875 at 3 (1968). 
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consent in electronic surveillance, but limited such surveillance to 
investigations "of offenses in connection with organized crime as de­
fined in the preamble."80 The organized crime provision thus served 
as an offset and limitation against the greater police powers permit­
ted by the single party consent provision.81 
The Thorpe majority recognized the difficulty of construing leg­
islative intent: 
No indication exists, either in the words· of the preamble or in the 
published legislative history of G.L. c. 272 § 99 ... that the Leg­
islature intended to limit the statute's application to persons with 
the status of full-time professional criminals-or, in the precise 
words of the dissent, "to those notorious and readily recognized 
highly 'structured criminal syndicate[s] composed of professional 
criminals who primarily rely on unlawful activity as a way of 
life,' " . . . Such a limiting definition would insulate from elec­
tronic surveillance all criminal activity, no matter how organized, 
disciplined, and repeated, carried on by those who maintain legiti­
mate jobs, perhaps in the public service, while at the same time 
committing the designated offenses set forth in G.L. c. 272, § 99 B 
7.82 
Two points may be made in rebuttal to the majority's assertion. 
First, while it may be true that there are no specific words which 
limit the statute to "structured criminal syndicates," the description 
of organized crime provided in the preamble such as, for example, 
"brutal and violent tactics"83 indicates that the legislature intended 
the statute to apply to more than a mere conspiracy. Second, al­
though as the majority states, there are no specific words limiting the 
statute to "full-time professional criminals," the legislative history 
shows that the organized crime provisions were intended specifically 
to limit police surveillance powers. All through the legislative his­
tory, and in the statute itself, the words "strict judicial supervision" 
and "limitation" appear repeatedly.84 
In view of this, it is difficult to see how the Thorpe majority 
80. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 99A, 99B7 (West 1970). 
81. This point is conceded by the Thorpe majority. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1836 
n.7, 424 N.E.2d at 255 n.7. 
82. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1834 n.6, 424 N.E.2d at 254 n.6. 
83. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99A (West 1970). 
84. See supra note 77. The preamble to the current statute echoes this theme: 
"[t)he use of such devices by law enforcement officials must be conducted under strict 
judicial supervision and should be limited to the investigation of organized crime." MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99A (West 1970) (emphasis added). 
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could be serving the intent of the legislature, as it says,85 by using the 
organized crime definition to expand the impact of police electronic 
surveillance, rather than limit it. The legislature's intent was that the 
organized crime provision would be used to limit access to warrant­
less surveillances, not to expand it. The dissent of Justice Liacos is 
correct: The majority view of Thorpe is contrary to the clear legisla­
tive history of the statute.86 
In addition to misreading the statute's intent, the court com­
posed a definition of organized crime which left several terms unde­
fined: "continuing conspiracy"; "highly disciplined"; and "illegal 
goods and services." A clearer understanding of these elements is 
needed if Thorpe and Jarabek are to be of any value for future 
courts. 
2. Defining "Continuing Conspiracy" 
Conspiracy was defined at common law as a combination be­
tween two or more persons to accomplish a criminal or unlawful act, 
or to do a lawful act by criminal or unlawful means.87 Under this 
definition, the activities of both Thorpe and Jarabek would consti­
tute a conspiracy.88 Yet when the supreme judicial court set out to 
define "continuing conspiracy", only the Thorpe activities were in­
cluded. While qualifying as a traditional conspiracy, the activities of 
Jarabek were not considered a "continuing conspiracy."89 
In drawing this line, the court failed to explain why the Thorpe 
conspiracy of an organization headed by a woman might be more 
85. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1833,424 N.E.2d at 254. 
86. Id at 1842 (Liacos, I., dissenting). 
87. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) III, 121-22 (1842). 
88. In Thorpe, the criminal or unlawful act for which the defendant was indicted 
was violation of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 2(a)(2) (West 1970) (influencing a 
state employee in the commission of a fraud upon the commonwealth). Brief for the 
Appellee-Commonwealth at 2, Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1827,424 
N.E.2d 250. The two or more person requirement is satisfied by defendant Thorpe's 
statement that the exam came from "an organization headed by a woman," 1981 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 1828. 
In Jarabek, the criminal or unlawful act for which the defendant was indicted was 
violation of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 2(b) (West 1970) (public employee solic­
iting something of value in return for performance), and § 3(b) (West 1970) (solicitation 
of gifts), and of conspiracy to violate both of these statutes. Brief for the Commonwealth 
at I, Commonwealth v. Iarabek, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1849,424 N.E.2d 491. The two or 
more person requirement is satisfied because defendant Iarabek was working through 
and in conjunction with an agent. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1850-51,424 N.E.2d at 492. 
89. Specifically the court said: "it appears the legislature intended to define organ­
ized crime as 'a continuing conspiracy among highly organized and disciplined groups' 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1833,424 N.E.2d at 492. 
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"continuing" than was the Jarabek conspiracy to extort political 
kickbacks. On the surface, the facts of Thorpe and Jarabek shed no 
light on the distinction of conspiracies which the supreme judicial 
court found between the two cases. The supreme judicial court 
needs to articulate more clearly what facts operate to give rise to a 
"continuing conspiracy." 
3. Defining "Highly Disciplined" 
A similar criticism may be addressed to the court's use of the 
term "highly disciplined." Two problems emerge from the court's 
failure to delineate adequately the meaning of "highly disciplined" 
within its definition of organized crime. First, there exists an inter­
nal inconsistency within Thorpe. While the court observed that the 
legislature intended to define organized crime as "highly organized 
and disciplined,"90 it found from the Thorpe facts only that a "cer­
tain amount" of organization and discipline would be required to 
acquire and supply the examinations illicitly.91 The difficulty is that 
the second standard is necessarily much looser and may be used to 
label as organized crime almost any conspiracy. As Justice Liacos 
points out in his dissent, one could easily infer that a "certain 
amount" of organization and discipline would be required to achieve 
the objectives of any conspiracy.92 But, the preamble to the Massa­
chusetts surveillance statute indicates that it was not the legislture's 
intent that every conspiracy be labelled "organized crime."93 
The second difficulty with the "highly disciplined" definition is 
that the standard employed in Jarabek is not consistent with that in 
Thorpe. Using its Thorpe analysis, the court could have inferred 
that a "certain amount" of organization and discipline would be re­
quired of a public works kickback conspiracy. Yet the court chose 
instead to apply the stricter "highly organized and disciplined" stan­
dard94 to exclude the Jarabek activities as an organized crime activ­
ity. In effect, this served to create two different standards. The 
90. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1852-53,424 N.E.2d at 493. 
91. Id at 1837,424 N.E.2d at 256. 
92. Id at 1845-46, 424 N.E.2d at 261. 
93. This can be seen by the narrow focus of the preamble's definition: specifically, 
its mention of the employment of brutal and violent tactics and of the infiltration of 
legitimate businesses. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99A (West 1970). As an exam­
ple, a conspiracy by two bank employees to embezzle funds from their employer is a 
conspiracy under the common law definition but would not be organized crime under the 
statutory preamble definition because it doesn't involve brutal tactics. Under Thorpe 
however, it could become organized crime by being labeled a "continuing conspiracy." 
94. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1852,424 N.E.2d at 493. 
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supreme judicial court has again failed to show what specific facts 
serve to constitute the standard which it wishes to prevail. Future 
courts have been left with no guidelines as to what facts to apply in 
what circumstance. 
4. Defining "Illegal Goods and Circumstances" 
The role that "illegal goods and services" play in the Thorpe­
Jarabek standard is similarly unclear. The activities in both cases 
were considered by the commonwealth to be an "illegal good or 
service."95 In the absence of specific reasoning by the court as to 
why the Jarabek activity failed to meet the definition of organized 
crime, a future court may speculate that it was the absence of an 
illegal good or service that caused the kickback scheme to fail the 
organized crime test. In failing to enumerate what standards were 
applied, or to distinguish the seeming inconsistencies within and be­
tween the two opinions, the supreme judicial court has opened the 
door for easy manipulation of facts and decisions by future courts. 
Interpretational flexibility is not a wise policy for fashioning the defi­
nition of organized crime because broad definitions may permit 
greater incidence of electronic surveillance. 
5. Explaining the Inconsistencies 
Taken together, the two cases make little sense. The underlying 
policies which may have caused the supreme judicial court to distin­
guish the two cases are not articulated. Indeed, the decisions seem 
highly result-oriented. It may have been that by broadening the or­
ganized crime definition beyond the statutory requirement that pub­
lic safety be threatened, brutal tactics be employed, and legitimate 
businesses be infiltrated,96 the court was attempting to remove or­
ganized crime identification from the narrower field traditionally 
thought of as the "mafia." There was some support for this idea in 
the commonwealth's briefs, in which it was argued rather extensively 
that organized crime today means more than the traditional notion 
of "mafia."97 
If this was the court's aim, the policies and interests behind the 
decision are still not well served because the facts necessary to estab­
95. See supra note 88. 
96. These elements were originally contained in the statute's definition of organ­
ized crime, see supra note 53 and accompanying text, but were dropped by the Thorpe 
court, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1833,424 N.E.2d at 254. 
97. Brief for Appellee-Commonwealth at 4-18, Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 1981 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1827,424 N.E.2d 250. 
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lish the new organized crime definition-the "continuing conspir­
acy"-remain unarticulated.98 
Alternatively, the decision in Thorpe may have been influenced 
by knowledge about a woman who previously had been involved in 
fixing civil service exams.99 Nothing in the facts indicates that such a 
connection was made; but, if it was, then the woman's on-going 
exam-fixing activities certainly could have served to put Thorpe 
more into the realm of a "continuing conspiracy" than a single iso­
lated event. The Jarabek scheme, on the other hand, had no such 
implication of past repetitive abuses, and it may be that is why the 
court decided the Jarabek activities were not of a continuing nature. 
A third explanation for the inconsistency of Thorpe and 
Jarabek may be that Thorpe was a result-oriented decision; and the 
supreme judicial court, realizing that the Thorpe rationale could be 
carried to an extreme result, offered Jarabek as an immediate limita­
tion. The court showed a sensitivity to the dangers of a Thorpe pre­
cedent when it stated that, despite its decision, a better future course, 
and the most secure one constitutionally, would be for law enforce­
ment officials to procure warrants in cases where probable cause can 
be shown. loo In setting forth a broad new proposition and then fail­
ing to apply it in a similar circumstance, the supreme judicial court 
may have attempted to signal that Thorpe should be limited to its 
facts. 
Regardless of the reasons or policies behind the supreme judi­
cial court's actions, the results are unsettling. When guidelines and 
definitions are left vague, those who must make future decisions 
98. Some courts have chosen to identify organized crime by a "pattern of racke­
teering" analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975). 
Under this analysis, there must be two acts of racketeering activity committed within ten 
years for the behavior to constitute organized crime. Id at 364. "Racketeering activity" 
has been defined by both statute, 18 U.S.c. § 1961(1) (Supp. V 1981) (delineating specific 
offenses), and by courts, see, e.g., United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286 (1969) (racke­
teering activity must be an act subject to criminal sanction and any proscribed act in the 
pattern must violate an independent statute). 
99. Briefs for both parties make references to a woman known to have been in­
volved in past schemes to fix or alter examinations. In the Commonwealth's brief, refer­
ence was made to an opinion of one of the Assistant Attorneys General supervising the 
case "that the defendant was connected with Esther Bell in the thefts and dissemination 
of the examinations." Esther Bell had entered a plea of guilty to changing grades on a 
civil service promotional exam. Brief, supra note 97, at 22. 
The defendant's brief touches on the same point, in describing the testimony of a 
state police lieutenant who "had been involved in previous Civil Service investigations 
and that a female had been indicted." Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 23, Common­
wealth v. Thorpe, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1827,424 N.E.2d 250. 
\00. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1842,424 N.E.2d at 259. 
743 1983) 	 ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 
about warrants for electronic surveillance will be left free to expand 

police powers at their discretion. For example, in a recent Massa­
. chusetts Superior Court case, Commonwealth v. Blood,101 warrantless 

surveillances were upheld against a burglary defendant. The court 

applied the Thorpe "continuing conspiracy" standard and found the 

defendant's conspiracy to constitute organized crime essentially be­

cause he and his co-conspirator were repeat offenders. 102 
By failing to define clearly the elements of its new "continuing 
conspiracy" definition, or to articulate what facts operate to consti­
tute such a conspiracy, the supreme judicial court has allowed an 
expanding organized crime definition to serve as a vehicle by which 
to permit the employment of more warrantless electronic 
surveillances. 
IV. THE PRIVACY ISSUE 
The privacy issue raised in Thorpe centered around a claimed 
violation of Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 103 
The privacy issue was not raised in Jarabek. The privacy rights em­
anating from both the state and federal constitutions are closely in­
tertwined. The supreme judicial court acknowledged this 
constitutional interdependence in Commonwealth v. Vitello, 104 a case 
involving the validity of the state surveillance statute. The Massa­
chusetts court stated that a detailed analysis of fourth amendment 
philosophy and federal surveillance cases was to be incorporated by 
reference into its opinion and considered an expression of the hold­
ing. 10S The Thorpe court re-emphasized the importance of the fed­
eral-state constitutional relationship by relying upon federal 
authority to respond to the defendant's claim 106 and by advancing 
101. 3 MSupp. 288 (1982). 
\02. Specifically, the court found evidence that "'highly organized and disci­
plined' groups worked together over a period of time and engaged in burglaries that 
. displayed a particular pattern." 	Id at 295. 
\03. See supra note 15. 
104. 367 Mass. 224, 327 N.E.2d 819 (1975). 

\05. Id at 242, 327 N .E.2d at 831. 

106. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1838,424 N.E.2d at 256-57. In response to defendant's 
claim of violation of the state constitution's privacy guarantees, the Thorpe court cited 
United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979), United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 
(1971), and Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). The three Massachusetts deci­
sions cited by Thorpe all resort to federal authority for the search and seizure and privacy 
issues. See Commonwealth v. Hall, 366 Mass. 790, 794-95, 323 N.E.2d 319, 322 (1975); 
Commonwealth v. Dinnall, 366 Mass. 165, 166-67,314 N.E.2d 903, 904 (1974); and Com­
monwealth v. Douglas, 354 Mass. 212, 221-22, 236 N.E.2d 865, 871-72 (1968), cerf. de­
nied, 394 U.S. 960 (1969). 
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the "assumption of risk" argument which had evolved in the United 
States Supreme Court. 107 An understanding of the development of 
the privacy doctrine in federal courts will provide an insight into the 
doctrine as incorporated within Massachusetts law. 
A. Development of the Privacy Doctrine 
The idea of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is 
so deep-rooted in the Anglo-American legal tradition that jurists on 
both sides of the Atlantic were describing the right as "fundamental" 
over two hundred years ago. 108 
107. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1839,424 N.E.2d at 257. The "assumption of risk" 
argument, which states that one contemplating illegal activity must assume the risk that 
his companions may be reporting to the police, was first articulated in Hoffa v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) and was later n:iterated in United States v. Whit,e, 401 
U.S. at 752 (1971). 
108. The right to privacy has existed in Anglo-American law for at least two hun­
dred years. James Otis argued against general writs in the Petition of Lechmere, in what 
is now the Old State House in Boston, and declared in February 1761 that general writs 
"violated the fundamental principle that a man should be secure in his own house." 2 L. 
WROTH & H. ZOBEL, THE LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 114-15 (1965). The court, 
however, saw it differently and afteia second hearing in November 1761 decided unani­
mously in favor of the writ. Id. at 115. The unpopularity of this decision with the colo­
nists may be attested to by the observation of eyewitness John Adams who, looking back 
some fifty years later remembered: "then and there the child Independance [sic] was 
born." Id. at 107. 
The right to privacy has been officially protected by the tort invasion of privacy 
since its general acceptance by most American jurisdictions during the 1930s. Recogni­
tion of this right came largely as a result of publicity generated from the 1890 Warren 
and Brandeis article "The Right to Privacy." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
TORTS 802-04 (4th ed. 1971). See infra note 115. 
Although not a legally recognized right in earlier times, the idea of a right of privacy 
was often mentioned in dicta and statements ofjudicial philosophy. Judge Thomas Coo­
ley planted the seed for the legal profession's modem interest by noting in 1888 that 
people had a "right to be let alone." T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 
(2d ed. 1888). Judge Story wrote in 1841 that the violation of correspondence "strikes at 
the root of all that free and mutual interchange of advice, opinions, and sentiments. . . 
[that] is so essential to the well-being of society." A. WESTIN, supra note 33, at 336. 
Many have traced the right to privacy back through various amendments of the Bill 
of Rights, inferring it from the first amendment's prohibition of scrutiny of political ex­
pression, the third amendment's prohibition of the practice of quartering troops, the 
fourth amendment's prohibition against general searches, and the fifth amendment's pro­
hibition against the compelling of self-incrimination. See J. RAINES, supra note 33, at 
115. In one of the broadest examples of judicial activism, Justice Douglas found the 
right of privacy in the penumbras of the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments, 
while two of his COlleagues located it more simply in the due process clause of the four­
teenth amendment. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). Justice Doug­
las was joined in this by Justices Harlan, id. at 500-02, and White, id. at 502-07. For a 
general background survey on the right to privacy, see A. BRECKENRIDGE, THE RIGHT 
TO PRIVACY (3d ed. 1971). For an excellent background on the basis for the fourth 
amendment right to privacy, see D. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 38-78 
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After independence was achieved, the founders of the new na­
tion attempted to eliminate forever the perceived abuses of the com­
mon practice which authorized searches of individual's homes 
pursuant to general warrants. 109 The drafters of the constitution 
wrote their prohibition expressly into the constitution by way of the 
fourth amendment. I 10 
The privacy violations resulting from general warrants were 
equally as offensive and traditionally disliked in England. In Entick 
v. Carrington, III a general warrant permitted a house search of a 
man suspected of printing seditious newspapers. 112 The court said of 
such illegal searches that they were "monstrous indeed! and if. . . 
lawful, no man could endure to live in this country." I 13 Lord Cam­
den, who delivered the opinion in Entick, was sensitive not only to 
the property trespass involved, but also to the privacy invasion 
which such searches worked: "For ransacking a man's secret draw­
ers and boxes to come at evidence against him, is like racking his 
body to come at his secret thoughts." 114 
The idea that privacy and property were intertwined was an 
idea which gathered growing favor in America and reached its ulti­
(1979). For an examination of the role of privacy in judicial philosophy, see generally 
Miller, Privacy in the Modern Corporate State: A Speculative Essay, 25 AD. L. REV. 231 
(1973); Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 281 
(1966). 
109. General warrants or general writs as they were sometimes called originated in 
England from the practice by which justices issued search warrants for the seizure of 
stolen property. The use of search warrants expanded slowly and imperceptibly to per­
mit searches among the papers of political suspects. When the specificity requirements of 
search warrants became burdensome, the practice evolved to one of issuing the general 
warrant, which authorized the King's agents to arrest anyone and search any house to 
apprehend unnamed authors and seize private papers. Fraenkel, Concerning Searches 
and Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361, 362-63 (1921). In the American colonies, the prac­
tice was employed by issuing similarly broad writs of assistance to revenue officers to 
search suspected places for smuggled goods. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 
(1886). 
110. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu­
larly describing the places to be searched, and the persons and things to be 
seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. That these provisions were written in response to perceived 
abuses of general warrants has long been recognized by American courts. See, e.g. , Boyd 
v. United States, 116 U.S. at 626-27. 
III. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765). 
112. Id at 1038. 
113. Id 
114. Id 
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mate expres~ion in the well-known Brandeis and Warren privacy ar­
ticle of 1890.115 Contemporaneously, the United States Supreme 
Court broadened considerably the concept of privacy by finding that 
both the fourth and fifth amendments interacted to create a compre­
hensive right of privacy in a search and seizure case. 116 In Boyd v. 
United States, 117 the Court echoed words of an earlier era, noting 
that it was not the breaking of a person's doors or the rummaging of 
his drawers that constituted the essence of the offense, but rather the 
invasion of his indefinable right of personal security, personal lib­
erty, and private property. I IS Subsequent courts have frequently 
noted the soundness of the Boyd principle that the fourth and fifth 
amendments interact to create a right of privacy. I 19 
Despite the fact that principles of property and privacy were 
connected at an early stage, the first electronic surveillance cases did 
not employ this interrelation analysis. In Olmstead v. United 
States,120 a divided Court l21 applied the traditional property ap­
proach to a wiretap situation, and held that, in the absence of tres­
pass, there could be no fourth amendment search and seizure 
violation associated with the wiretap.122 
The Olmstead property perspective of fourth amendment rights 
was controlling law for over twenty-five years. 123 Nevertheless, a 
115. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890). The 
authors explored this intricate interrelationship by observing that the law had grown in 
response to the nation's expanding emotional, intellectual and technological life, so that 
the concept of property had broadened to encompass every form of possession, intangible 
as well as tangible. Id at 194-95. Intangible property included a right to privacy, or a 
right to be "let alone", id at 195, such that, even if a person had chosen to give his 
thoughts expression, he generally retained the powers to fix the limits of the publicity 
which shall be given them. Id at 198. 
116. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The plaintiff protested that a 
court order to produce the invoices for disputed goods was a violation of his fifth amend­
ment rights. The court agreed, finding not only a violation of the fifth amendment privi­
lege against self-incrimination, but also a violation of the fourth amendment protection 
against unreasonable search and seizure. Id at 630. 
117. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
118. Id at 630. Compare supra text accompanying note 114 (Lord Camden's state­
ment in 1765). 
119. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 456 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
120. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
121. The Court was split 5-4, with dissents written by Justices Holmes, Brandeis, 
Butler, and Stone. Id at 469-88. 
122. The case concerned government officials who made tapping connections to 
telephone lines in public locations. In the absence of acts of trespass against the plain­
tiffs house, person, papers or effects, the Olmstead Court refused to find a search or 
seizure. Id at 464-65. 
123. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United 
States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). 
747 1983] ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 
philosophical split, beginning with the dissent of Justice Brandeis in 
Olmstead,124 divided the Court for that entire period of time. Nar­
row majorities continued to uphold the Olmstead property analysis 
of search and seizure,125 while dissenting minorities argued from En­
tick, Boyd, and the Brandeis and Warren article that warrantless 
surveillance should be prohibited as a violation of the privacy right 
guaranteed under the fourth amendment. 126 The persuasive force of 
124. See infra note 126. 
125. In Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), the Court upheld evidence 
from a detectaphone placed outside a hotel room wall without a warrant. As in Olm­
stead, the absence of a trespass precluded the Court from finding a fourth amendment 
violation. Id at 134-35. The Court delivered the decision with a 5-3 split; dissents were 
written by Justices Stone, Frankfurter, and Murphy, with Chief Justice Stone and Justice 
Frankfurter indicating an express desire to have Olmstead overruled. Id at 136 (dissent­
ing opinion). 
In On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), a friend of the plaintiff entered the 
plaintiffs laundry acting as an undercover agent and wearing a concealed transmitter 
which relayed incriminating statements to an outside receiver. The evidence was upheld 
because the agent's presence in the laundry was consensual and not a trespass. Id at 
751-52. Here the Court was split 5-4, with dissents written by Justices Frankfurter, 
Douglas, Burton, and Black. Justice Black stated that he believed the district court 
should have rejected the evidence challenged. Id at 758 (dissenting opinion). 
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), involved tapes of conversations made 
by an I.R.S. agent who had been offered a bribe. Id at 430. Again, the majority of a 
split Court rejected the plaintiffs privacy argument and upheld the property principles of 
Olmstead and Goldman. Id at 438, 441. 
126. In his memorable dissent in Olms/ead, Justice Brandeis argued from Boyd 
that protection against invasion of the "sanctities of a man's horne and the privacies of 
life" was provided in the fourth and fifth amendments by specific language. And, taking 
note of the growing means of government espionage heralded by the advent of wire 
tapping even then (1928), he warned: 
'That places the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer' was 
said by James Otis of much lesser intrusions than these. To Lord Camden, a far 
slighter intrusion seemed 'subversive of all the comforts of society'. Can it be 
that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual 
security? 
277 U.S. at 473-74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
Dissenting in Goldman, Justice Murphy relied on the Brandeis and Warren privacy 
article, as well as Entick, Boyd, and the Brandeis dissent in Olmstead to assert: "On the 
value of the right of privacy, as dear as any to free men, ... [s]uffice it to say that the 
spiritual freedom of the individual depends in no small measure upon the preservation of 
that right." Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 137 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
Dissenting in Lopez, Justice Brennan similarly alluded to Entick, Boyd, and the 
Brandeis dissent in Olmstead, to criticize: 
Olmstead's illiberal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as limited to the 
tangible fruits of actual trespasses was a departure from the Court's previous 
decisions, notably Boyd, and a misreading of the history of the purpose of the 
Amendment. Such a limitation cannot be squared with a meaningful right to 
inviolate personal liberty. It cannot even be justified as a 'literal' reading of the 
Fourth Amendment. . 
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 454-55, 459 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
748 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:725 
the privacy argument was recognized by Justice Douglas when he 
observed that the issue was "constantly stirred by those dissents."127 
A shift in the philosophical balance of fourth amendment doc­
trine finally occurred in 1967 in two Supreme Court decisions: Ber­
ger v. New York l28 and Katz v. United States}29 Berger identified 
electronic surveillance as a search and seizure within the meaning of 
the fourth amendment, thereby requiring that warrants for such sur­
veillances meet the warrant standards for other fourth amendment 
searches. DO Katz occasioned the final demise of the Olmstead prop­
erty analysis for fourth amendment surveillances. In Katz, the Court 
stated that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."l3l 
This statement sent out a new signal that privacy, not trespass, was 
the appropriate inquiry for fourth amendment surveillance 
problems. 132 
The constitutional boundaries for electronic surveillance were 
further defined in 1971 when the Supreme Court decided United 
States v. White. 133 There, the Court upheld warrantless evidence ob­
tained in a consensual recording, based on an "assumption of risk" 
doctrine. 134 Although the White Court stated that the warrantless 
surveillance involved did not violate the fourth amendment, it 
127. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 762 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
128. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
129. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
130. 388 U.S. at 63-64. In Berger, the issue revolved around a court order for the 
bugging of an office. In prior cases of warrantless surveillance, the Court had avoided 
invoking a fourth amendment analysis by finding no physical trespass. Here, however, 
there was a warrant, and the Court's scrutiny focused on the warrant and the statute 
under which it was issued, and on the fourth amendment standards for such. In this way, 
the Court's reasoning was led to apply fourth amendment guarantees to the area of elec­
tronic surveillance. Id. at 59-60. 
131. 389 U.S. at 350-51. 
132. In Katz, law enforcement agents attached an electronic listening and record­
ing device to the outside of a public telephone booth. Justice Stewart, writing for the 
court, ushered in a new era for the protection of privacy when he stated: 
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so 
eroded by our subsequent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine there enunciated 
can no longer be regarded as controlling. The Government's activities in elec­
tronically listening to and recording the petitioner'S words violated the privacy 
upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus con­
stituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen 
to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance. 
389 U.S. at 353. 
133. 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
134. Id. at 749. See also supra note 107. 
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pointed out that its decision was based on pre-Katz law.135 Once 
again the Supreme Court was divided on the issue of electronic sur­
veillance, with dissents written by Justices Douglas, Harlan, and 
Marshall. 136 
As it presently stands, the law on electronic surveillance is a 
clouded mixture ofKatz and White.137 The force ofKatz's inclusion 
of electronic surveillance under the umbrella of the fourth amend­
ment has been somewhat diluted by White which has excluded war­
rantless recordings from fourth amendment protection where one 
party to the recording has consented. 138 The impact of White how­
ever has also been diluted; its reliance on pre-Katz law, and the per­
suasive force of its dissenting opinions have left it vulnerable to 
criticism from diverse sources.139 
B. The Privacy Issue Raised by Thorpe 
The defendant in Thorpe asserted that his privacy rights, as 
guaranteed by both the state and federal constitutions, had been vio­
lated. 140 On appeal to the supreme judicial court, defendant aban­
doned his federal constitutional challenge and advanced his privacy 
violation claim based solely on the state constitution. 141 Nonethe­
less, the response of the supreme judicial court embodied a discus­
sion of federal constitutional authorityI42 and relied on the federally 
created doctrine of "assumption of risk,"143 as advanced in United 
135. The warrantless surveillances occurred in 1965 and 1966; Katz was decided in 
1967. Since Katz was not retroactive, the Court ruled that its decision should be based 
on the pre-Katz law of electronic surveillance, as exemplified in On Lee. Id at 754. 
136. Id at 756-96 (dissenting opinions). 
137. See, e.g., United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979). For varying interpre­
tations of the manner in which Katz and White have been interpreted, see infra notes 
164-68 and accompanying text. 
138. 401 U.S. at 749. 
139. See infra notes 157-59, 164-68 and accompanying text. 
140. Specifically, defendant asserted a violation of his privacy right as guaranteed 
under the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article 14 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1831,424 N.E.2d at 253. 
141. Id 
142. The cases relied upon by the Supreme Judicial Court were either federal 
cases, or state cases citing federal authority. See supra note 106. 
Nowhere in its opinion does the Thorpe court state the relationship between the state 
constitutional privacy provision in article 14 and the federal provision in the fourth 
amendment. Instead, the court concludes, after discussing the line of federal authority 
on privacy: "In the case at bar we find no violation of the State Constitution. . . . This 
is not the type of warrantless surveillance condemned by the courts and commentators 
discussed above ...." 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1841,424 N.E.2d at 258. 
143. See supra note 107. 
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States v. White .144 
This section will argue that the Thorpe court's reliance on 
White's "assumption of risk" doctrine is insecure because of the logi­
cal inconsistencies of the doctrine itself, and because of the recog­
nized weakness of White as precedent. 
1. Criticism of The "Assumption of Risk" Doctrine 
The "assumption of risk" doctrine has been criticized by both 
judges and commentators for drawing a faulty analogy between the 
ordinary eavesdropper and one who is electronically bugged. Dis­
senting in United Slales v. Lopez, 145 Justice Brennan observed a 
qualitative difference between electronic and conventional eaves­
dropping.146 Whereas conventional eavesdroppers may be shut out 
of a conversation by the lowering of voices or the withdrawal of the 
speaker to a more private place, the electronic eavesdropper may not 
be so easily excluded. Justice Brennan concluded that the only way 
to guard against such a risk "is to keep one's mouth shut on all 
occasions." 147 
Similarly, Justice Douglas, dissenting in Uniled Slates v. 
While,148 called electronic surveillance the "greatest leveler of 
human privacy ever known."149 He further said that to equate 
eavesdropping and electronic surveillance is like treating "man's first 
gunpowder on the same level of the nuclear bomb."150 He further 
observed that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were not to be 
read as covering only the technology known in the eighteenth 
century. 151 
144. See supra note 134. 
145. 373 U.S. 427, 446-71 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
146. Id. at 465-66. 
147. Id. at 450. Both the federal and state statutes provide that conversations may 
be monitored with the consent of one of the parties. See supra notes 37-39 and accompa­
nying text. Justice Brennan criticized this statutory distinction which would permit sur­
veillances where at least one party to the conversation consents, but which would 
preclude surveillances where neither party has consented to being monitored by a third 
party. Justice Brennan argued that the distinction thus made is entirely fictitious because 
the ensuing privacy violation to a speaker is equal regardless of whether the other party 
to the conversation has consented to electronic monitoring. 373 U.S. at 452. The sensi­
ble solution for Brennan is not consensual one-party surveillance, but rather no warrant­
less surveillance at all; in a later case, he stated that he would have required a warrant for 
the surveillances conducted in On Lee, Lopez and While. United States v. White, 401 
U.S. at 755-56 (Brennan, J., concurring in result). 
148. 401 U.S. 745, 756-68 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
149. Id. at 756. 

ISO. Id. 

lSI. Id. 
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Commentators also have found fault with the "assumption of 
risk" doctrine. One commentator has questioned why, even if it is 
"reasonable" to require individuals to assume the risk that those in 
whom they confide are secret agents, it is also reasonable to require 
the same individuals to assume the risk that the "agents" are elec­
tronically recording or transmitting their conversations. 152 The 
problem foreseen is that, in a society where people are increasingly 
apprehensive of being monitored and recorded, free expression will 
be inhibited. 153 
The underlying premise of the "assumption of risk" doctrine, 
that electronic surveillance is no more harmful than ordinary ea ves­
dropping, has been derided by another commentator as "wildly be­
side the point." 154 Justifying official electronic surveillance by 
saying the speaker assumes the risk is like justifying an official 
break-in to a car by saying that the owner assumed the risk it would 
be burglarized when he parked it. 155 
2. Criticism of While as Precedent 
Several state courts have shown a trend towards expanding state 
guarantees of privacy, thereby diminishing the impact of While. The 
Alaska Supreme Court, in a 4-1 decision,156 took note of the Bren­
nan dissent in Lopez and the split decision in While and ruled that 
warrantless recording by a police informant was inadmissible as a 
violation of a person's reasonable expectations that the conversation 
will not be secretly recorded. 157 In so doing, the Alaska court con­
strued its state constitutional privacy provision 158 as a general prohi­
bition on the warrantless monitoring of conversations. 159 
The Supreme Court of Florida has also ruled against warrant­
152. Stone, The Scope oj the Fourth Amendment: Privacy and the Police Use oj 
Spies, Secret Agents, and Informers, A.B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 1193, 1253-54 (1976). 
Stone carries this inquiry to the threshold by questioning the "reasonableness" of the first 
assumption that individuals must assume the risk that persons in whom they confide are 
secret agents. lei. 
153. lei. at 1254. 
154. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 
406-07 (1974). 
155. lei. 
156. State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978). 
157. lei. at 876-77, 879-80. 
158. lei. at 879-82. The full privacy provision from the Alaska constitution reads: 
"The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed. The legisla­
ture shall implement this section." ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22. 
159. State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 881 (Alaska 1978). 
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less electronic surveillance, even where one party has consented. 160 
There, the state constitution's search and seizure provision was ex­
panded to cover "unreasonable interception of private communica­
tions,"'61 and the addition of these words was deemed sufficient to 
override the White court's decision that consenting parties to a con­
versation may escape the warrant requirement. '62 
The constitutions of both Alaska and Florida have provisions 
beyond the search and seizure guarantees of the federal Constitu­
tion. Nonetheless the courts in both states felt compelled to distin­
guish White before proceeding to their conclusion. 163 
A situation more closely analogous to Massachusetts is found in 
Michigan. There, as in Massachusetts, privacy rights are derived di­
rectly from a search and seizure statute which is modeled after the 
fourth amendment.'64 In a 1975 case,165 a defendant argued from 
Katz before the Michigan Supreme Court that an expanded right of 
privacy included freedom from warrantless surveillance, even in the 
situation where one party consented. 166 The state argued that White 
was controlling. 
The Michigan court noted White was a plurality opinion, and 
stated it was most persuaded by the dissent of Justice Harlan which 
rejected the "assumption of risk" argument. 167 Relying on Katz and 
the Harlan dissent in White, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that 
third-party monitored conversations, whether transmitted by a party 
or consenting person, would require a warrant. The court also noted 
160. Tollett v. State, 272 So. 2d 490,494 (Fla. 1973). 
161. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12. The Florida search and seizure provision, which is 
identical with the fourth amendment, was revised in 1968 by the addition of protections 
against "unreasonable interception of private communications by any means" and the 
further requirement that "the communications to be intercepted, and the nature of evi­
dence to be obtained" be included in the warrant. Id 
162. Tollett v. State, 272 So. 2d 490,493 (Fla. 1973). 
163. Id at 492-93; State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 876 (Alaska 1978). 
164. The Michigan search and seizure provision states: 
The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be secure from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize 
any person or things shall issue without describing them, nor without probable 
cause, supported by oath or affirmation. The provisions of this section shall not 
be construed to bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding any narcotic 
drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other dangerous weapon, seized by a 
peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in this state. 
MICH. CONST. art. I, § II. Compare Massachusetts search and seizure provisions, supra 
note IS, and those of the fourth amendment, supra note \09. 
165. People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1975). 
166. Id at 562, 227 N.W.2d at 513. 
167. Id at 565, 227 N.W.2d at 515. 
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that none of the cases relied upon in White involved third-party 
monitoring. 168 
At least one state has required the suppression of warrantless 
tape recordings based on a privacy interpretation of the fourth 
amendment itself. In Montana, where the state's constitutional pri­
vacy provision is similar to that of Alaska, 169 the state supreme court 
relied heavily on the rationale of Katz to disallow one party consen­
sual recordings. 17o The Montana court also noted that because 
White was a plurality decision and had been decided on pre-Katz 
law, its precedent was not binding. l7l 
These decisions show that state courts have found ways to cir­
cumvent White. Courts have chosen to disregard White, and rely 
instead on Katz, to ascribe to White only limited force because of its 
split opinion, or to rely instead on the White dissents. Courts have 
rejected White because it was decided on pre-Katz law or because it 
had not relied on third-party monitoring cases. A state supreme 
court has at its discretion the implements to provide for broader pri­
vacy guarantees in keeping with the spirit of Entick, Boyd, and an 
expanding privacy doctrine. The erosion of White in the courts of 
other states has shown that, should the Massachusetts Supreme Judi­
cial Court choose to expand the right to privacy from electronic sur­
veillance for its citizenry, it need not be constrained in its efforts by 
White. 
3. The Need for Stronger Privacy Guarantees 
In recent years, legal scholars, social scientists and others con­
cerned with privacy have concluded that its basic feature is the abil­
ity of an individual to control the flow of information about 
himself. 172 Genuine concern has been expressed that the rising use 
of police informers l73 and sprawling technology l74 pose a threat not 
168. Id 
169. The Montana right to privacy provision states: "The right of individual pri­
vacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the 
showing of a compelling state interest." MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10. 
170. State v. Brackman, 178 Mont. 105, 108, 117,582 P.2d 1216, 1217, 1222 (1978). 
171. Id at 108,582 P.2d at 1217. 
172. See, e.g., A. MILLER, supra note 33, at 25; A. WESTIN, supra note 33, at 7; 
Ruebhausen & Brim; Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1184, 1189-90 
(1965); Shils, supra note 108, at 281-82; Stone, supra note 152, at 1207. 
173. One court has estimated that secret informers are used "tens of thousands of 
times" annually in the United States. See Holmes v. Burr, 486 F.2d 55, 65 (9th Cir.) 
(Hufstedler, J., dissenting), cerl. denied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973). A commentator has de­
scribed the growth of secret informers as a "sprawling mass-producing, self-perpetuating 
system of spies and informers." Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 401. 
174. See supra note 34. 
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only to the value of open expression necessary in a free society, 175 
but also to the ordinariness and simplicity of life. 176 Because the 
Supreme Court has held, with only one exception over the last fifty 
years, I77 that the fourth amendment imposes no meaningful re­
straints on the use of spies and informers, it has been criticized· for 
failure to exercise foresight in this problem. 178 
The development of modern government bureaucracy and its 
growing role in our lives have added a further dimension to the pri­
vacy problem. The government's acquisition of information in con­
nection with its licensing, taxing, and administrative duties l79 has led 
some to conclude that, because our lives are more inextricably tied to 
government today than in 1791, the fourth amendment's protection 
of privacy should properly be viewed as extending to the preserva­
tion of the individual's interest in keeping information away from 
the "prying hands, eyes, and ears of the government."180 Ways in 
which this may be achieved are discussed in the following section. 
175. Frank, honest, and spontaneous private discussion as well as open discourse 
has been recognized by courts as essential to our free society. See, e.g., United States v. 
United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972). 
176. The fear of being spied upon may not only inhibit free public and private 
expression, but may bring about changes in personal behavior. For example, one com­
mentator has suggested that if an official entered his home, he might discover an unmade 
bed, unwashed dishes, piles of clothing scattered about, etc., which would cause the resi­
dent to feel exposed and embarrassed. Such an experience might cause the individual so 
exposed to change small personal habits to avoid such future embarrassment. The com­
mentator goes on to suggest that when discussing the grander aspects of liberty, we 
should not lose sight of the other unnoticed day-to-day liberties we cherish as well. 
Stone, supra note 152, at 1207. 
177. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). 
178. Professor Stone for example has criticized: "These decisions ... are too 
often conclusory in nature, poorly analyzed, and reflect a tendency to reach a given result 
without normal concern over doctrine or the law's long term impact." Stone, supra note 
152, at 1229. 
179. For example, government agencies collect and maintain information in con­
nection with the tax system, the welfare system, the social security system, for the licens­
ing of automobile drivers, the operation of businesses, and professional practices. Jd. at 
1239. 
180. Jd. at 1209. Attempts to compare today's society and government to that of 
1791 for the purpose of discovering what the framers of the fourth amendment would 
enact today are of course entirely speculative. Professor Stone, observing the history of 
early English cases like Entick, and Supreme Court decisions like Boyd, stated that "it 
seems reasonable to conclude that, in prohibiting the unrestrained rummagings of gov­
ernmental officials, the framers sought not only to protect property rights but also to 
preserve the ability of individuals to determine for themselves when, how, and to what 
extent information about them is revealed to others." Id. at 1208. 
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V. TOWARDS A CONCRETE SURVEILLANCE STANDARD 
The development of electronic surveillance doctrine has paral­
leled the doctrine of search and seizure. 181 The analogy has ad­
vanced in recent years as the analysis of electronic surveillance has 
shifted from a trespass to a privacy perspective. 182 The analogy with 
search and seizure has become imbalanced, however, because ad­
vancing technology has afforded a greater potential for privacy 
abuse of electronic surveillance than that associated with warrantless 
searches. 183 The question remains unanswered whether such poten­
tial for abuse would have been tolerated by the framers of the fourth 
amendment. Observers have noted that the intent of the framers was 
reasonably clear: Like Entick, the fourth amendment was written to 
stem the abuses of the eighteenth century practice of issuing general 
warrants. 184 In the eighteenth century, general warrants, not war­
rantless searches, were the more greatly feared source of privacy 
violation. 185 
Had warrantless searches been abused in the eighteenth century 
to the same extent as were general warrants, it is reasonable to expect 
that there would have been a public outcry similar to that which 
issued against the use of general warrants. 186 Similarly, had the po­
tential for abuse of warrantless searches been perceived by the fram­
ers to the same extent as was the potential for the abuse of general 
181. See supra text accompanying notes 120-32. 
182. See supra text accompanying notes 136-37. 
183. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
184. Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 410. For example, one commentator has ar­
gued that the framers of the fourth amendment were concerned above all with the preser­
vation of the individual's right to personal privacy and freedom from unwarranted 
government surveillance. Stone, supra note 152, at 1271. 
Another commentator has suggested that the real issue with general writs was that 
they served to immunize the scope of executive seizure from judicial control. Amster­
dam, supra note 154, at 412. 
185. Not much is known about the extent of warrantless searches in the eighteenth 
century aside from the fact that the common law recognized a warrantless search incident 
to arrest. It is not certain whether this exception extended the privilege of warrantless 
search beyond the body. Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 412. The real fear of eighteenth 
century citizens seems to have been not a warrantless search of the person, but rather the 
ransacking of houses and the taking of private papers and possessions. It was against 
abuses such as that that both Lord Camden and James Otis argued, and about which the 
framers of the fourth amendment were concerned. Id at 410, 412. The issuance of gen­
eral writs was seen as such an abuse because the general writ did not describe the items 
subject to seizure, nor require their inventory or return, thereby lending itself to the over­
reaching effect of search on suspicion alone. Id at 412. It was this fear of the overreach­
ing effects of warrants, not the fear of warrantless searches, to which the framers of the 
fourth amendment responded. Id at 410. 
186. See supra note 185. 
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warrants, it is reasonable to expect that restrictions on the employ­
ment of warrantless searches would have been written into the fourth 
amendment beside the restrictions on searches under warrant. IS7 It 
makes no sense that the framers of the fourth amendment would 
have gone to express lengths to safeguard against the potential pri­
vacy abuse of the search warrant, only to permit the employment of 
warrantless searches to exact the same abuse by evading the fourth 
amendment guarantee. ISS 
When the court in Commonwealth v. Thorpe permitted the war­
rantless electronic surveillance to stand as evidence, it demonstrated 
an example of the futility of addressing a twentieth century problem 
with an eighteenth century standard. The growing potential for pri­
vacy abuse has been well documented and discussed. ls9 This poten­
tial encompasses the same elements which caused apprehension to 
the framers of the fourth amendment: a violation of the individual's 
right to privacy from government surveillance l90 and the exercise of 
executive seizures absent judicial supervision. '91 Yet, by statutory 
construction, the Thorpe court removed the surveillance from fourth 
amendment protections by exempting it from the warrant 
187. This is a reasonable assumption in light of the fact that the framers of the 
fourth amendment were not concerned at the time about warrantless searches, but rather 
about overreaching warrants. Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 410. 
188. The fourth amendment guarantees that the people will be free from unreason­
able searches and seizures and that warrants will be issued only upon showing of prob­
able cause, supported by oath or affirmation, with specific description of the place to be 
searched and the persons or things to be seized. See supra note 110. The purpose of the 
search warrant is to assure that the decision whether there is probable cause to search or 
seize be made by a neutral and detached magistrate, rather than the officer engaged in 
the investigation. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Melendez v. 
Shultz, 356 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Mass. 1973). The guarantee that a neutral and detached 
magistrate will make the probable cause determination is evaded where a court permits 
the search or seizure to stand without a warrant. See Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 1981 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1827,424 N.E.2d 250 (probable cause determination made by local police 
officials conducting the investigation). 
The important issue presented by Thorpe is not only the presence or absence of 
probable cause for the seizure, but also who is to make the determination. 
189. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
190. At least one commentator has argued that privacy and freedom from govern­
ment surveillance was the primary concern of the framers. See Stone, supra note 152, at 
1271. For authorities describing the growing threat of government surveillance by elec­
tronic means, see supra note 33. 
191. One commentator has suggested that the real issue with general writs was that 
they immunized the scope of executive seizures from judicial control. It was for this 
reason that warrants were required by the fourth amendment to be sworn by oath or 
affirmation, with a particularity of description of persons, places and things to be 
searched. Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 412. Where there is no warrant, as in Thorpe, 
the potential exists for evading this constitutional control. 
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requirement. 192 
While such construction has been permitted by United States v. 
White,193 the doctrine should not go unquestioned. The Supreme 
Court has stated that police must, whenever possible, obtain advance 
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant pro­
cedure. 194 The continued existence of the "assumption of risk" doc­
trine serves to undermine that mandate. Warrantless electronic 
surveillance poses the same threat to freedom and privacy today that 
general warrants did two hundred years ago. 195 Both forms of 
search and seizure deserve equal treatment under the constitution. 
One possible solution would be to examine the policies behind 
permitting warrantless searches, and then permit warrantless elec­
tronic surveillances only where such policies are similarly served. 
The following exceptions to the warrant requirement have been 
recognized: hot pursuit;196 stop and frisk;197 search incident to ar­
rest; 198 and various forms of consensual and administrative 
192. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1837-38,424 N.E.2d at 256. 
193. In While, the Supreme Court upheld warrantless evidence contained in a con­
sensual recording, stating that it did not violate the fourth amendment. 401 U.S. at 754. 
194. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972); Chimel 
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 20 (1968). 
195. Justice Brandeis thought general warrants were "but puny instruments of tyr­
anny and oppression compared with wire-tapping." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 
at 476 (Brandeis J., dissenting). 
196. No warrant is required when police are in immediate pursuit of a suspect if 
they have personal knowledge or reliable information about his whereabouts. See, e.g., 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (evidence admissible when police entered and 
searched a house without warrant to which an armed robber was reported by a witness to 
have fled). 
197. Without probable cause to make an arrest, a police officer may stop a suspi­
cious person, question him and, for his own protection if he reasonably believes him to 
be armed, pat his outer clothing for a weapon. I WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
§ 179, at 360-62 (C. Torcia 13th ed. 1972). See, e.g., Michigan v. De Fillippo, 443 U.S. 31 
(1979) (police officer's search valid when a suspect after being stopped, refused to identify 
himself); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (evidence admissible when officer 
noticed revolver under jacket as suspect fled car); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 
(1972) (evidence admissible when police officer searched suspect in response to tip from 
known informer); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968) (evidence admissible when detective 
patted down two men seen patrolling in front of store and conferring periodically). Bul 
see United States ex reI. Richardson v. Rundle, 325 F. Supp. 1262, (E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd 
on olher grounds, 461 F.2d 860 (3d CiT. 1972), cerro denied, 410 U.S. 911 (1973) (defend­
ant was not suspected of any definite crime and police officer had no reason to believe 
suspect to be armed and dangerous). 
198. After defendant's arrest, a warrantless search may be conducted as incident to 
the arrest. If the arrest is lawful, the incidental search will also be lawful. I WHARTON'S 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 180, supra note 197, § 180, at 363-73. See, e.g., Cupp V. Mur­
phy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (when suspected strangler voluntarily came to a police station 
for questioning, evidence of blood and fingernail samples taken without warrant was 
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searches. l99 With the exception of consensual and administrative 
searches, the policy underlying these exceptions is what is usually 
called either exigent circumstances200 or necessitous haste.2ol This 
policy permits a search and seizure without a warrant where speed is 
essential or delay would endanger the lives of the authorities or other 
innocent persons.202 
Exigent circumstances do not usually exist in the context of elec­
tronic surveillance where time is normally not so critical as to pre­
clude the obtaining of a warrant.203 The only consistent exception to 
admissible due to the evanescent nature of the evidence); Chime I v. California, 395 U.S. 
752 (1969) (arresting officers may search arrestee's person to discover and remove weap­
ons or prevent concealment or destruction of evidence). 
199. These include: consent to search by the accused, I WHARTON'S CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE, supra note 197, § 181, at 373; consent to search by third person, id. , § 182, at 
390; border searches, 10. , § 184, at 399; and administrative inspections, 10., § 185, at '403. 
200. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,20 (1968) (dictum). 
201. Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 412. 
202. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967). 
203. A sampling of electronic surveillance cases over the past ten years shows little 
evidence of the presence of exigent circumstances. The general sense is that such surveil­
lance is normally employed to detect general conspiratorial planning over a period of 
time, premised on the general notion of a threat, rather than to combat the threat of 
immediate acts of violence for which time is of the essence. See, e.g., Sinclair v. Klein­
dienst, 645 F.2d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (surveillance of Black Panther Party between Jan­
uary and June 1969 premised on general grounds of violent goals of organization and its 
contacts with foreign radicals); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (sur­
veillance by Justice Department of Jewish Defense League from October 1970 to June 
1971 premised on general ground that the organization's anti-Soviet activities were detri­
mental to the nation's foreign relations). 
Some cases show a long lapse of time between the initial suspicion and the final 
surveillance sufficient to afford an opportunity to obtain a warrant. See, e.g. , Forsyth v. 
Kleindienst, 599 F .2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979) (FBI learned of anti-war conspiracy in June 
1970, and conducted a wiretap of the conspirators between November 1970 and January 
1971). 
Many surveillance cases involve investigations of illegal possession or sale of drugs 
or contraband based on tips or reasonable suspicion in situations where there is sufficient 
time to obtain a warrant. See, e.g., Miroyan v. United States, 439 U.S. 1338 (1978) (Drug 
Enforcement Administration agents obtained warrant to install monitor on drug smug­
gling aircraft); United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977) (warrant obtained to 
monitor suspected illegal gambling activities); United States v. De La Fuente, 548 F.2d 
528 (5th Cir. 1977) (warrant obtained in pursuit of investigation of drug dealing). 
It is also common for the policing organization to cooperate or participate in the 
monitored activity, such as by investigating a monitored conversation, or conducting or 
arranging a sale of contraband. In situations such as this, where the policing organiza­
tion controls the timing, it would be difficult to argue that exigent circumstances exist. 
See, e.g., Holmes v. Burr, 486 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1973) (monitored conversation of liquor 
store operator arranged and investigated through cooperation with state liquor depart­
ment which was conducting the investigation); United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (heroin sale negotiated with agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dan­
gerous Drugs); United States v. Stephenson, 490 F. Supp. 619 (ED. Mich. 1979) (Drug 
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this is where such surveillance may be authorized for purposes of 
national security.204 
The use of warrantless surveillance cannot be justified as fur­
thering the aims of federal and state surveillance statutes. Statutes at 
both federal and state levels tolerate electronic surveillance only for 
the purpose of fighting organized crime.205 The existence of exigent 
circumstances in such a setting is unlikely because the surveillance 
contemplated for such an aim is directed at the organizational as­
pects of organized crime, such as planning and secret meetings.206 
As further illustration that warrantless surveillance is not essen­
tial for fighting organized crime, the legislative history behind Title 
III shows that the federal warrantless surveillance exceptions in sec­
tion 2SII(2)(c)207 were intended largely to codify established case 
law as it then existed,208 not specifically to fight organized crime as 
was ,the rest of the statute. The continuing tolerance of warrantless 
surveillance in the federal statute was an unrelated afterthought; 
warrantless surveillance was not then, nor is it now, a component 
logically or intrinsically necessary for the accomplishment of the 
statute's expressed purpose. For this reason, it would in no way in­
terfere with the purpose of the federal or state surveillance statutes if 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court were to 'rule, as did the 
Michigan Supreme Court, that the growing scope of surveillance 
Enforcement Administration agents, working with a drug manufacturer, placed monitor 
in chemical cans being delivered for a suspiciously large order). 
The other area where electronic surveillance is often employed is the area of domes­
tic disputes. Here again, the circumstances seldom indicate the presence of an exigent 
situation. See, e.g., Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (phone tapped for 
six month period by spouse suspicious of an extra-marital affair). 
Exigent circumstances are, however, occasionally found in connection with elec­
tronic surveillance. See, e.g., United States v. Moskow, 588 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(when government agent was solicited to set fire to building, the circumstances were con­
sidered to constitute an emergency due to the known record of the suspect). 
204. National security surveillances are not subject to the warrant requirements 
contained in 18 U.S.c. § 2518. Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F. Supp. 561, 575 (E.D. Mich. 
1979). 
205. See supra notes 41 & 77 and accompanying text. 
206. The Senate report for Title III stated: "Organized criminals must hold meet­
ings to lay plans. Where the geographical areas over which they operate is large, they 
must use telephones. Wiretapping and electronic surveillance techniques can intercept 
these wire and oral communications." S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 73-74, 
reprinledin 1968 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 2161. See also letter from Governor 
Volpe to the Massachusetts House and Senate, supra note 77. 
207. See supra note 37. 
208. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 93-94, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS at 2182. 
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technology209 has made electronic surveillance outside the protec­
tions of the fourth amendment no longer acceptable. Such a ruling 
would have several beneficial effects. It would eliminate the poten­
tial for abuse which permits after the fact acceptance of warrantless 
surveillances through Thope-like definition-stretching.210 It would 
eliminate the anomaly that the area of greatest potential abuse­
warrantless surveillance-is also the area of least control or protec­
tion.211 It would serve the specifically articulated intent of the Mas­
sachusetts General Court by affording stricter supervision of 
electronic surveillance by the judiciary.212 It would accomplish this 
without detracting from the true intent of the statute which is to en­
hance the state's ability to fight organized crime.213 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The effect of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's rul­
ings in Thope and Jarabek is to alter the statutory definition of or­
ganized crime to the judicially created concept of a "continuing 
conspiracy." By broadening the definition, the court has facilitated 
the encompassing of a greater range of activities. The court's action 
will permit a greater incidence of electronic surveillance in Massa­
chusetts for two reasons. First, because the state statute exempts 
electronic surveillance from the warrant requirement if the surveil­
lance concerns investigations of organized crime, a broader defini­
tion of organized crime will permit a broader incidence of electronic 
surveillance. Second, because the Thope-Jarabek "continuing con­
209. See supra note 33. 
210. By broadening the definition of organized crime, increased levels of warrant­
less surveillance will now be permissible because almost any conspiracy may be fitted 
into the new definition. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
21t. The standard for warrantless surveillance in Massachusetts is now "reason­
able suspicion." Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1837,424 N.E.2d at 
256. The standard for surveillance requiring warrants, probable cause, is a stricter stan­
dard. Id at 1835,424 N.E.2d at 255. 
212. See supra notes 77 & 84 and accompanying text. 
213. The problem with the definition of organized crime would still remain. The 
problem would still exist if warrantless surveillance were eliminated because connection 
to a designated offense would still be a requirement at a probable cause hearing to obtain 
a warrant. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99E2 (West 1970). Such a system still 
would be preferable to the present one because decisions made by the state's courts are 
more likely to develop a uniform set of standards than are spontaneous decisions made 
in police stations. Such a system would also be more in keeping with the legislative 
mandate that electronic surveillance be strictly supervised by the judiciary. Finally, such 
a system is more in keeping with the constitutional guarantee of freedom from unreason­
able searches and seizures because it would require the approval of a detached and neu­
tral magistrate. 
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spiracy" standard is imprecise as to what facts need to be shown, 
future courts will have to interpret on a case by case basis. A court 
desirous of upholding surveillance evidence is given broad leeway to 
apply the definition loosely. At the very least, such broad grants of 
discretion can lead to inconsistent results. 
In Thorpe, the court justified the warrantless surveillance by in­
corporating the "assumption of risk" doctrine from United States v. 
White. The high courts of several other states have either distin­
guished or disregarded White for the purpose of placing greater limi­
tations on electronic surveillance and advancing the privacy rights of 
their citizens. The same could have been done by the Supreme Judi­
cial Court of Massachusetts. 
The United States Supreme Court should re-consider White and 
the "assumption of risk" doctrine. White's status as precedent has 
been oft-criticized by commentators and judges. Modern electronic 
surveillance is at least as great a threat to privacy as are searches and 
seizures. Both forms of privacy invasion should receive equivalent 
supervision under the fourth amendment. Yet warrantless electronic 
surveillances in consensual situations continue to be a major loop­
hole at both the state and federal level. One solution might be for 
courts to apply an exigent circumstance limitation on warrantless 
electronic surveillance as is done with warrantless searches. 
Legislatures at both the state and federal level have stated their 
intention to curtail and strictly control electronic surveillance. Spi­
raling technology has enabled those who would spy to do so with 
greater sophistication and ease, in contravention of that clear intent. 
The courts and legislatures should begin now to readdress a problem 
which has grown beyond the contemplation of earlier lawmakers. 
William Hewig 111 
